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PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS  
in The New History of Originalism 
 
The emergence of a new form of originalism has sparked an interest in the 
theory’s past that is particularly welcome as developments on the Supreme 
Court and in the Republican Party unsettle the theory’s place in American 
law and politics.  Our understanding of the theory’s development, however, 
has been limited by an unfortunate and unnecessary division between what 
are now two separate histories of originalism.   One history examines the 
theory’s development in academia and emphasizes the influence of 
principled argument.  A second investigates its role in politics and 
highlights the role of conservative interests.  This review essay identifies 
this division and offers two ways to create a productive dialogue.  It first 
suggests we consider how political interests have shaped the academic 
debates over originalism by influencing the institutions that produce those 
debates.  Second, it urges a reconsideration of how and why academic 
debates have shaped the theory’s political uses.  There is good reason to 
consider whether principled constitutional argument, and thus the debates 
of academics, have shaped the political uses of originalism even if the 
theory’s most important advocates were motivated mostly – or even entirely 
– by the pursuit of political advantage.  Using these approaches to identify 
the reciprocal influence of politics and principle on originalism’s past can 
help produce the new history of originalism we need to understand, 
evaluate, and influence the theory’s role in American law and politics.   
 
Introduction 
 
We have gone from too few histories of originalism to too many, 
just when understanding the theory’s past is needed to help address its 
suddenly uncertain future. For decades, originalism played an important and 
stable role in American law and politics: it was the constitutional theory of 
conservatives.1 Today, it is still embraced by conservative judges, 
academics, and ‘tea party’ revolutionaries, but its influence now extends to 
leading progressive academics and judges like Jack Balkin and Justice 
Kagan.2 Yet there are also indications the theory’s influence may be starting 
                                                 
1 JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005) [hereinafter O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006). 
2 Post & Siegel, supra note 1; Christopher Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the 
Right: Some Lessons from the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523 (2011); JACK M. 
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to wane, including the death of Justice Scalia—originalism’s most visible 
and perhaps most effective proponent—as well as disarray in the 
Republican Party.3  
We understand these developments better because of a recent and 
growing interest in originalism’s past, but the insight that literature offers 
has been limited by an unfortunate and unnecessary division. Right now, 
there are two separate histories of originalism. One examines originalism in 
the academy and emphasizes the way principled argument has shaped the 
theory’s development.4 A second has investigated originalism’s political 
history. It highlights how the theory has responded to conservative political 
interests.5  
This essay provides a critical review of that literature that both calls 
attention to this division and suggests a way to bridge it.  It does not try to 
critique or improve the practice of originalism itself.6  It is agnostic on the 
                                                                                                                            
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan) (The founders 
“sometimes…laid down very specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles. 
Either way we apply what they say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all 
originalists.”). 
3 Eric Posner, Why Originalism will Fade, ERICPOSNER.COM (February 18, 2016), 
http://ericposner.com/why-originalism-will-fade/. But see Jack Balkin, Why Originalism 
Will Not Fade Away, BALKINIZATION (February 19, 2016), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/02/why-originalism-will-not-fade-away.html [hereinafter 
Balkin, BALKINIZATION].  
4 See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2015) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012)); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935 [hereinafter 
Solum, Unwritten]; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism]; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism 
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Nonoriginalists]. 
5 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 1; Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal 
History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869 [hereinafter Ziegler, Originalism Talk]; Dawn E. Johnsen, 
Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-First Century, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Johnsen, Lessons from the Right]. 
6  It is not, for example, an intervention into the ongoing debates over whether the 
methods of intellectual history should inform the practice of originalism.  Lawrence B. 
Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015) 
[hereinafter Solum, Intellectual History]; G. Edward White, Intellectual History and 
Constitutional Decision Making, 101 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2015) [hereinafter White, 
Intellectual History]; Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist 
Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015); Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding 
in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 
 
31-Mar-17]  3 
proper originalist method and the propriety of originalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation.  It instead aims to improve our understanding 
of the theory as a historical phenomenon of importance to American law 
and politics by creating a productive dialogue between originalism’s 
academic and political histories.  Its core claim is that we can create that 
dialogue by building on insights produced by the recent investigations of 
the conservative legal movement and by applying traditional, but too easily 
forgotten, insights of intellectual history.  
The emerging history of the conservative legal movement has shown 
how political interests helped create institutions like the Federalist Society 
and the law and economics movement, which have, in turn, had lasting 
effects on constitutional debate.7 Investigating similar links between 
originalism and conservative interests can help connect originalism’s 
academic and political histories.  Originalism’s two histories can also be 
brought into dialogue by re-considering whether the conservative activists 
who use originalism in political debate have been constrained by boundaries 
of legitimate legal argument, and thus by debates of academics, which help 
establish those boundaries. Earlier efforts to explore this influence have 
been undermined by understandable doubts that political activists regularly 
place constitutional principle ahead of political interest.  Thus, a primary 
goal of this review essay is to offer a plausible account of how the limits of 
principled argument might constrain the choices of political activists not in 
spite of the political motivations of those activists but instead because of 
those political motivations.8  
A productive dialogue between originalism’s political and academic 
histories can help create a new history of originalism that is more than an 
extension of the normative debates that have been underway for decades. 
The current divided history of originalism implicitly debates whether 
originalism has been a principled interpretive method or a mere 
rationalization for conservatism. But that question is far too simple to 
                                                                                                                            
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013) [hereinafter Cornell, Intellectual History]. See generally 
Symposium, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 
(2013). 
7 See, e.g., AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKEY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST 
SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 20–21 (2015); STEVEN M. TELES, 
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE 
LAW (2008) (hereinafter TELES, RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT).  
8 See MEANING IN CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 76 (James Tully ed., 
1988); James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of Pragmatic 
Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 201 (2012) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Thinking 
Historically]. Explorations of other aspects of this approach include Cornell, Intellectual 
History, supra note 6, and Gienapp, Historicism and Holism, supra note 6.  
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produce the insights we need to understand the theory’s past and guide its 
future.  
 
Originalism’s Two Histories   
 
The growing interest in understanding originalism’s past is certainly 
welcome. Whether one finds originalism a convincing theory of 
constitutional interpretation or not, it has played a central role in American 
law and politics for decades.9 Studies of its development can help us 
evaluate the remarkable changes that have characterized the theory’s recent 
past, as well as provide insights into American political development and 
the role constitutional theory plays in law and politics more generally.10 
Unfortunately, the potential of this new interest has been limited by a 
division between work on originalism’s development in academic debate 
and in political fora.  
  
Originalism’s Principled Past 
 
Scholars became interested in originalism’s past about a decade 
ago,11 but the history they have produced has proceeded along two different 
tracks, each of which has examined originalism in different contexts, has 
been driven by different concerns, and has provided different explanations 
for the theory’s changes over time. One camp is largely populated by the 
advocates of what is now called the ‘New Originalism.’ With important 
support from the work of Jonathan O’Neill,12 Keith Whittington, Lawrence 
Solum, Randy Barnett, and others have turned to originalism’s past in order 
to distinguish their arguments for ‘New Originalism’—which focuses on the 
original public meaning of the constitution—from ‘Old Originalism’—an 
interpretive method that emphasizes the intentions of the constitution’s 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1; Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of 
the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, De Facto ERA]. 
10 See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183 
(2011) [hereinafter Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters]; Johnsen, Lessons from 
the Right, supra note 5. 
11 See O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra, note 1; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or 
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive]; Jonathan O’Neill, Shaping Modern Constitutional 
Theory: Bickel and Bork Confront the Warren Court, 65 REV. OF POL. 325 (2003) 
[hereinafter O’Neill, Bickel and Bork]; Jonathan O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration 
of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253 (2001) [hereinafter O’Neill, Raoul Berger]. 
12 See, e.g., O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1. 
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framers.13 As a result, they have developed an account of originalism’s past 
that uses law reviews as core sources and that emphasizes the ways that 
principled argument has shaped the theory’s development.14  
In their account of originalism, the theory emerged when the Warren 
and Burger Courts’ aggressive protection of individual rights alarmed 
scholars concerned with judicial restraint,15 popular sovereignty,16 or 
separation of powers, republican government, and the rule of law.17 
Convinced these values were not being protected by political process 
jurisprudence or calls for judicial restraint, Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and 
others refocused constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of 
Constitution’s drafters.18 Like the critics of the ‘Lochner Court’ whose 
mantle they adopted, these scholars were concerned primarily with majority 
rule and democratic legitimacy.19 The focus of the ‘Old Originalism’ they 
developed was the subjective intent of the founders,20 which was used to 
limit judicial discretion21 and to criticize the Warren and Burger Courts. 
They did not, however, produce a comprehensive theory of constitutional 
interpretation.22  
Scholars began to abandon this Old Originalism in response to 
academic challenges, intellectual developments, and changes in at the 
                                                 
13 Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (2012) 
[hereinafter Greene, Original Intent] (arguing that the goal of this history was to 
differentiate old and new originalism).  
14 See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4; Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 4; Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism]; Solum, Unwritten, 
supra note 4; Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 611–12; Lawrence B. Solum, 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 927 (2009) 
[hereinafter Solum, Heller]; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14; Michael W. 
McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 
98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND 
LAW (1988); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 
779–95; see also Greene, Original Intent, supra note 13, at 1687 n.23 (calling Barnett’s 
description of the shift from original intent to original meaning the “standard account”).  
15 See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601–02 (“Above all, 
originalism was a way of explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done 
wrong in this context was primarily to strike down government actions in the name of 
individual rights.”). 
16 Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 930. 
17 O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 110. 
18 Id. at 93, 110, 131. 
19 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 
4. 
20 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14 at 603. 
21 Id. at 602; O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 107. 
22 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601. 
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Supreme Court. Academics like Paul Brest and Jefferson Powell raised 
import questions about the theory. How could a single intent be derived 
from the often-conflicting concerns of multiple authors? What is the proper 
level of abstraction at which that intention should be described? Should it 
matter that the founders themselves did not believe their intentions were 
binding? And why should the ‘dead hand’ of the past control modern 
American government?23 Changes on the Court produced further 
challenges.24 When Rehnquist, Scalia, and other originalists joined the 
Court, the theory needed to do more than critique a handful of Warren 
Court decisions. It had to justify the exercise of judicial review more 
broadly.25 Intellectual developments shaped the response to these 
challenges. Most important was the growing interest in history, which was 
shared by leading non-originalist scholars like Akil Amar and Bruce 
Ackerman,26 and hermeneutic theory’s concern with textual meaning.27    
The result was ‘New Originalism.’ Unlike its predecessor, New 
Originalism offers a comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation 
based on the original meaning of the constitution.28 It is not just a critique 
of the Warren Court, nor a mere effort to encourage judicial restraint. It is 
an attempt to identify the proper role of the judge in our constitutional 
democracy.29 As a result, its appeal has not been limited to conservatives. It 
has attracted scholars from a variety of political perspectives, including 
libertarians like Randy Barnett and progressives like Jack Balkin.30  
This account of originalism’s past was developed and deployed to 
clarify changes in the normative debates over the theory.  But in doing so it 
has offered an explanation for originalism’s development:   why the theory 
emerged, why it changed form from old to new originalism, and why it has 
won ardent defenders. That explanation emphasizes the role of principled 
constitutional argument. Originalism, in this account, was produced by 
concerns with the legitimacy of the Warren Court’s approach to 
                                                 
23 Id. at 605–06. 
24 See id. at 603–04.  
25 See id. at 604. 
26 Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 932. See also, G. Edward White, The Arrival of 
History in Constitutional Law Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002) [hereinafter White, 
Arrival of History]. 
27 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 606. 
28 Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 933. 
29 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 608–09. 
30 See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG 
(Nov. 16, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2014/11/legal-theory-
lexicon-originalism.html; Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 611–12 [hereinafter 
Solum, Lexicon]. 
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constitutional interpretation, shaped by the earnest efforts of academics to 
find a principled approach to constitutional interpretation, and attracted 
broad support because those academics shaped it into a plausible, practical, 
and principled theory of constitutional interpretation.31  
 
 Originalism’s Political Past 
 
This emphasis on principled argument as a way to explain 
originalism’s emergence and development is not shared by a second set of 
scholars, who were attracted by different reasons to investigate a different 
aspect of originalism’s past. Robert Post, Reva Siegel, Dawn Johnsen, Mary 
Ziegler, and others have investigated what they call ‘originalism as political 
practice.’ They have asked why interest groups chose to deploy originalist 
arguments, how originalism is related to the goals of the conservative 
movement, and what lessons originalism’s success can teach progressives.32 
They focused on actors outside the academy—primarily politicians and 
interest groups—and how those actors used the theory to advance their 
political interests. That focus made them quite skeptical that principled 
argument is responsible for the ways that originalism has changed over 
time. They concluded instead that originalism emerged to help conservative 
activists legitimate their political interests, changed as those interests 
changed, and has been so broadly adopted because it does that job well.33   
Robert Post and Reva Siegel sparked this investigation.34 In a 
seminal article, they concluded that originalism was a more or less blatant 
effort ‘to alter the Constitution so as to infuse it with conservative political 
principles.’35 Its success, they continued, ‘does not reflect the analytic force 
                                                 
31 Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 617; see also McConnell, supra note 14; 
Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411 
(2013) [hereinafter Barnett, Gravitation]; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14. 
32 See, e.g., Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 5; Johnsen, Lessons from the Right, 
supra note 5. 
33 Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Judicial Activism Arguments, the Abortion 
Debate, and the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2013) 
[hereinafter Ziegler, Grassroots]; Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial 
Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 558–62 (2010); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 
GEO. L.J. 657, 696, 716 (2009) [hereinafter Greene, Selling] (“The success of originalism 
results not from its penetrable logic, but from its consistency with a political morality 
defended most ardently by originalism’s opponents.”) (noting originalism also is successful 
because it appears value-neutral); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith & Frank B. 
Cross, The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 
104–06 (2007); Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 549. 
34 Post & Siegel, supra note 1. 
35 Id. at 561. 
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of its jurisprudence, but instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused 
citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based 
political movement.’36  
To support these claims, they showed the political uses of 
originalism. Ronald Reagan invoked it justify his appointments of Scalia, 
Rehnquist, and others judges, who he expected to advance a narrow, 
conservative, ideological agenda. Conservative outcomes, not neutral 
processes, were his goal.37 Conservative lawyers used originalism to 
legitimate litigation they hoped would advance conservative preferences, 
not neutral principles.38 Republican politicians used the theory to urge their 
supporters into action.39 On the bench, it served the same ends. Scalia’s 
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas was exemplary of his efforts to mobilize 
conservative voters through his opinions.40 And Scalia, Thomas, and other 
originalist judges used the past to justify their conservative views when they 
could, then ignored it when they could not.41    
Leading conservative intellectuals, interest groups, and politicians 
shaped originalism to fit their political preferences. Focus on the Family 
identified it with support for religious freedom and opposition to abortion, 
the right to homosexual sex, and obscenity.42 Socially conservative 
organizations like Liberty Counsel ‘cashed out’ terms like the ‘respect for 
the Constitution’ and for the ‘rule of law’ as fidelity to ‘traditional values of 
religion, gender, and family.’43 Even for academics, originalism was a 
political tool. Robert Bork, they argued, saw originalism as a call for the 
restoration of a particular set of morals and customs.44 Originalism, in this 
view, was not a result of a principled search for the Constitution’s original 
meaning. It was simply a re-description of conservative political values.  
The theory has not changed over time in response to principled 
argument; it arose to help conservatives criticize the liberal results of the 
Warren Court45 then changed along with conservative politics.46 When 
research suggested originalism would allow segregated schools in the 
District of Columbia, conservative advocates ignored it. ‘[T]hose who 
                                                 
36 Id. at 549. 
37 Id. at 556. 
38 Id. at 575. 
39 Id. at 565. 
40 Id. at 567. 
41 Id. at 562, 565. 
42 Id. at 556 n.54. 
43 Id. at 573. 
44 Id. at 560 n.74. 
45 Id. at 547. 
46 Id. at 558. 
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guided the political practice of originalism had no intention of assaulting 
Bolling [v. Sharpe], much less Brown [v. Board of Education].’47 
Originalists initially opposed the incorporation doctrine, but now agree the 
First Amendment applies to the states.48 Originalists once opposed elevated 
scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Now they support it.49  Those changes 
were not a result of disinterested research. They were efforts to align 
originalism with the latest developments in conservative politics.50  
Research by other scholars into archival sources and interviews 
offers an opportunity to open dialogue between originalism’s two histories, 
as I will discuss later, but it has also extended Siegel and Post’s insights. 
Steve Teles, Mary Ziegler, and Jefferson Decker have confirmed that 
originalism’s political value was well understood by conservative 
activists.51 Steve Teles’s study of the Meese Justice Department showed 
that the Department turned to originalism in 1985 to justify legal policies 
that the Reagan Administration was already pursuing. 52 In Reagan’s first 
term, the Department sold those policies on a case by case basis, with 
unsatisfactory results.53 In the second term, the Department used 
originalism to legitimate those same policies to legal experts and the 
public.54 Meese’s speechwriter recalled that the public discussions of 
originalism were a way to  
 
….give a philosophical context for those policy disputes 
[including abortion and the Miranda v. Arizona decision], to 
elevate the conservative legal view, to ‘these are not just the 
policies that support the business community, but these are 
political and legal issues that are rooted in something more 
transcendent than the disputes of the moment.’....The 
speeches, the rhetorical dimension of the department, were to 
give context for all those other, more mechanical activities, 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 559–60. 
49 Id. at 559. 
50 Id. 
51 See JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE 
LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2016); Ziegler, Originalism 
Talk, supra note 5; Ziegler, Grassroots, supra note 33; Steven M. Teles, Transformative 
Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy]. 
52 Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 51, at 76. 
53 Id. at 77. 
54 Id. 
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like filing suits and joining as amicus.55 
 
Originalism was many things, but for the conservative officials who 
advanced it during Regan’s presidency, it was a tool to legitimate 
conservative policies.  
 Likewise, the right to life movement saw originalism as a tool to 
help them curb abortions.56 Mary Ziegler studied the movement’s decision 
to adopt originalism by supplementing public documents with internal 
memoranda of the Reagan Administration, the National Right to Life 
Committee, and other interest groups.57 Prior to the Bork nomination, the 
pro-life movement opposed originalism and used natural law and human 
rights theories to argue the 14th Amendment created a constitutional right to 
life for the unborn.58 Their claims were inconsistent with the theory of 
originalism and its implications, which called for overruling of Roe v. Wade 
and the return of abortion rights questions to the political processes of the 
states.59 The movement did not even welcome originalism when Meese 
made it the official constitutional theory of the Reagan Administration.60 
They changed their position only when they saw the political 
benefits of joining the originalist coalition.61 Their natural law and 
fundamental rights arguments failed to convince lower courts to recognize 
that the unborn had a legal right to life.62 The Supreme Court also seemed 
unwilling to change that basic assumption.63 Efforts to ‘confirm’ the 14th 
Amendment provided a right to life with a constitutional amendment 
failed.64 And the movement saw that opposing originalism limited their 
influence over Reagan’s judicial appointments.65 When the Bork 
nomination failed, these concerns led them to publicly embrace 
originalism.66 This was not a change of heart. Among themselves, they 
continued to agree that the fetus had a constitutional right to life supported 
                                                 
55 Id. (quoting Interview with McDowell, July 2007). 
56 Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 32, at 920. 
57 Id. at 907–20. 
58 Id. at 881–82. 
59 Id. at 898, 919 (“[T]he constitutional theory that [abortion opponents] developed 
before Roe . . . . stood in tension with interpretive theories centered on the idea of original 
intent”). 
60 Id. at 882. 
61 Id. at 919–20. 
62 Id. at 904–05. 
63 Id. at 913 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Servs., 462 U.S. 416 
(1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
64 Id. at 898–904. 
65 Id. at 919.  
66 Id. 
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by natural law readings of the 14th Amendment.67 But publicly they 
deployed originalist arguments to criticize pro-choice Justices and to 
endorse pro-life, Republican appointees. Originalism was a tool to expand 
their influence over Republican judicial appointees, undermine Roe v. 
Wade, and decrease abortions.68  
This view presents originalism as a post-hoc rationalization for 
conservative political goals.69 It gives conservatives grudging respect for 
making originalism into a powerful tool for legitimating their politics, but it 
is political motives that drive originalism’s development.  Principle does not 
play an important role, a stark contrast to the account offered by 
originalism’s advocates.  
 
A Divided History of a Connected Subject 
 
 The difficulty with these two literatures is not that they examine 
originalism in different contexts. The theory has played an important role in 
both academic debate and political life. Nor is it troublesome that they 
pursue different goals.  It is entirely legitimate to look to originalism’s past 
to learn how politics shaped the theory’s uses and to discuss originalism’s 
past to clarify ongoing normative debates.  The problem is that the two 
literatures do not engage one another, which diminishes our understanding 
of the theory’s development over time and its role in law and politics.  
There is a sharp division between the two historical accounts of originalism, 
but clear connections between the orginalism’s academic and political life.  
From the inception of modern originalism political actors have 
regularly responded to and used the products of academics. Raoul Berger’s 
Government by Judiciary is considered by many the starting point for 
modern originalist theory,70 and its publication was immediately hailed by 
William F. Buckley in the pages of the National Review, the magazine 
many consider the starting point for the intellectual integration of the 
modern Republican Party.71 In 1987, the Department of Justice published a 
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‘Guide to Litigators in Constitutional Cases,’ which ostensibly set out the 
approach government litigators should take to arguing constitutional cases. 
It made originalism as the official interpretive theory of the Reagan Justice 
Department and many of its claims were backed by citations to Robert 
Bork, Raoul Berger, and other early originalists.72 Similarly, The 
Constitution in the Year 2000, another publication of the DOJ’s Office of 
Legal Policy, regularly cited the research of originalist academics to support 
the goals of the conservative leadership of the DOJ.73  
Academic debate regularly responds to originalist argument by 
political actors. The Court, of course, continually sparks debate. Consider 
the attention District of Columbia v. Heller sparked in law reviews.74 But 
more traditional political actors shape legal debate as well. Attorney 
General Ed Meese, for example, secured originalism’s place in academic 
debate when he announced the Reagan Administration’s embrace of the 
theory.75 Critics of originalism responded to Meese’s claims.76 Its academic 
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supporters stepped in to defend him.77  
In addition, some of the same people have played an important role 
in originalism’s political and academic life. Gary McDowell was a political 
scientist and an advisor to Attorney General Meese who argued for 
originalism in both positions.78 Stephen Calebresi worked closely with 
Meese when the Attorney General was promoting originalism most 
aggressively, then became one of originalism’s most able defenders in 
academia.79 James McClellan spent much of his career as an academic 
political scientist, but also worked as Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee 
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary when the 
GOP controlled the upper chamber.80 He later ran the Center for Judicial 
Studies, which advanced originalist arguments in public debate by 
publishing, among other things, Benchmarks, a law journal aimed at 
educating the public that regularly supported originalist arguments.81 Before 
entering academia, Mike Paulsen, Randy Beck, John McGinnis, Michael 
Rappaport, Doug Kmiec, and many others served in important roles in the 
Reagan and Bush Justice Departments, then became powerful advocates for 
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originalist methods in the academy.82 Such interwoven relationships and 
repeated interactions strongly suggest that the enduring similarities between 
originalist argument in the academy and in politics did not occur by chance.  
 
 
Bridging the Divide:  Investigating Political Influences on 
Principled Debate  
  
The durable similarities and repeated interactions between 
originalism’s academic and political lives suggest that a dialogue between 
the theory’s academic and political histories would be productive.  The 
question is how to create that dialogue?  One way is to follow the example 
of recent research on the conservative legal movement. Led by Steve Teles, 
scholars in a variety of disciplines have shown how conservative activists 
responded to the realization that electoral victories did not immediately 
transform public policy.83 Many policy arenas had been constitutionalized 
and when President Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointees did not 
produce the counter-revolution conservatives hoped for, they looked for 
new strategies.84 Conservative interests like the Olin Foundation poured 
resources into organizations that could help produce legal change.85 They 
recruited lawyers of quality and distinction, found volunteers to fund 
                                                 
82 Faculty & Staff: Mike Paulsen, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW, 
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lawsuits, developed intellectual resources, and then kept these assets 
connected and working together.86  
The most successful of these organizations was The Federalist 
Society. Started with seed money from the Olin Foundation and the 
commitment of a group of law students, the Federalist Society has not only 
helped feed talented lawyers into the growing number of conservative 
public interest law firms, it has also helped credential a new set of judges 
and academics who have acted as intellectual entrepreneurs. It has been a 
remarkable success.87 Amanda Hollis-Bruskey has shown how closely 
connected the Federalist Society is with some of the most important 
conservative victories of the last two decades. Arguments were developed 
by Federalist Society academics, advanced by conservative public interest 
law firms staffed by Federalist Society lawyers, presented to law clerks who 
were members, and then embraced by Federalist Society judges, including 
Scalia, Alito, and Roberts.88  
But the influence of this organizing on originalism is only beginning 
to be investigated. Teles has examined originalism’s development in 
government, but how the purposeful creation of organizations to advance 
conservative goals has shaped the production of originalism has not been 
explored.89 Hollis-Bruskey’s study of the Federalist Society recognizes that 
commitment to originalism is core commitment of its membership, but she 
focuses on the impact of the society, not how its commitments were 
developed.90 More research like Erin Cady’s examination of the Olin 
Foundation could help reveal important connections. 91  
 
Bridging the Divide: Investigating Principle’s Influence on 
Political Debate 
 
 A more serious challenge to generating dialogue between the 
academic and political histories of originalism is to show the way the 
principled debates of academics have shaped the political uses of the theory. 
Neither scholars concerned with originalism’s political history nor those 
interested in its academic history have embraced the few claims that 
academic debates matter because conservative political actors share the 
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principled motives of scholars. Even scholars willing to consider whether 
principled argument has shaped the success of the conservative legal 
movement have focused on the impact those debates have had on the courts 
rather than on more traditional political actors.  
 Nevertheless, there is evidence that principle has shaped the way 
that conservative political actors have used originalism. What this section 
offers is an explanation for why that might be that does not depend on the 
dubious assumption that most, or even many, political actors are share 
academics’ concern for legal and constitutional principle.  Instead, this 
section assumes that political actors are motivated primarily – or perhaps 
even exclusively - by their political goals.  It then explains why those 
political motivations might lead them to attend carefully to legal and 
constitutional principle. Finally, it argues that such a politically motivated 
concern with principle could lead conservative activists to shape their uses 
of originalism in ways that are attentive to academic debates.   
 
Principled Motives for Political Action 
 
The only express effort to write a unified history of originalism is 
Johnathan O’Neill’s Originalism in American Law and Politics.92 His 
explanation for how the political and academic histories of originalism 
interact, however, has not been embraced by either of the two current 
histories of originalism.  That may be in part because his narrative 
emphasizes the role principled motives played in shaping the political uses 
of originalism, a possibility both histories of originalism find dubious.   
O’Neill’s narrative indicates that the political and academic histories 
of originalism were connected because both were shaped by a similar 
concern with legal and constitutional principle. In the 1980s, he argued, 
there was a natural alignment between the majoritarian premises of both 
originalism and the conservative movement. Academics like Robert Bork 
and Raoul Berger were attracted to originalism because it advanced 
majoritarian democracy. This part of his narrative has been adopted by 
originalism’s academic history.93  But he also argues that Originalism 
attracted political actors like Edwin Meese and others for similar reasons. It 
was originalism’s majoritarian thrust, O’Neill wrote, that attracted the 
support of the Reagan administration and its supporters who ‘regarded 
several Supreme Court decisions as politically distasteful, constitutionally 
mistaken affronts to limited, representative government.’94 Originalism, he 
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wrote, was sometimes dismissed as a ploy to advance conservative policy 
goals. But, it was not merely a call for conservative results in constitutional 
adjudication. The reason for originalism’s success in the 1980s was the 
theory’s appeal ‘to the principle and rhetoric of limited government[,] 
consent-based politics, . . . [and] its traditional understanding of the nature 
of constitutional interpretation.’95  
 Those suggestions have not been embraced.  Siegel and Post’s 
article was published a year after O’Neill’s book and soundly rejected the 
claim that principle has played an important role in originalism’s emergence 
and development in the political arena.96 For them and those that followed 
them, the conservative movement’s use of originalism was merely 
camouflage for the politics that were really driving the theory’s 
development.97 Those interested in Originalism’s academic history have 
been equally dubious that principle has played in important role in 
originalism outside the academy. Keith Whittington explicitly dismissed the 
influence of principle outside the academy when he described the 
emergence of the New Originalism. ‘I have no particular illusions,’ he 
wrote, ‘about the consistency or sophistication of constitutional theorizing 
on the bench.’98  
 Other scholars, including most prominently Jamal Greene, have 
suggested that principle may have shaped originalism’s development 
outside academia, but they have not considered whether principle 
influenced traditional political actors. Greene argues that originalism 
succeeded not just because it advanced conservative policies but also 
because it had particular characteristics that made it an especially useful 
tool for that purpose.99 And, at moments, he suggests one of those 
characteristics was consistency with principle.100 A successful constitutional 
theory, he writes, ‘requires both consistency with a dominant political 
agenda and an accompanying narrative that promises consistency with 
prevailing legal norms.’101 He further suggests that judges might be 
particularly concerned with a constitutional theory’s consistency with legal 
principle because they could lose prestige and influence by advancing 
                                                 
95 Id. at 134. Meese, he wrote, began his political campaign for originalism because of 
“a conviction among conservative activists that the intellectual structure of modern 
constitutional jurisprudence had to be confronted in a more direct and public manner.” Id. 
at 154. 
96 See supra notes 32–6950 and accompanying text. 
97 Greene, Selling, supra note 33, at 689. 
98 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 599. 
99 Greene, Selling, supra note 33, at 657. 
100 Id. at 715. 
101 Id. at 714–15. 
18 The New History of Originalism [31-Mar-17 
unprincipled theories.102 But ultimately he does not extend that argument to 
include traditional political actors, or explore how a concern with principle 
might have shaped originalism’s development.103 
There are good reasons for these doubts. At first glance it is unclear 
why hard-boiled political activists should care about the views of ivory 
tower academics. That is particularly true when those activists can develop 
arguments on their own, as the Meese Justice Department did. Under 
Meese’s leadership, the Department dedicated tremendous energy to 
developing originalist ideas. It invited speakers, hosted discussions, and 
created opportunities for its lawyers to not just learn about originalism, but 
take part in shaping it.104 Justice Scalia, Judge Bork, and other luminaries of 
the conservative legal movement took part in these discussions.105 And the 
results poured out of the Department’s Office of Legal Policy in a series of 
reports, source books, and directives, all of which helped define 
originalism.106 If activists could develop originalist arguments that 
legitimated their political goals without the help of ivory tower academics, 
why listen to them?  
 
Political Motives for Principled Action 
 
Perhaps, however, those hard-boiled political activists cared about 
the limits of principled argument—and thus the debates of academics— not 
in spite of, but because of their political motivation. Perhaps principle might 
shape an actor’s behavior even if it is not a motive for action.107 If so, 
conservative activists may well have seen constitutional principles as post-
hoc rationalizations for their political goals, but nevertheless felt 
constrained to shape their behavior to be consistent with those principles. 
And that concern with principle may have led them to attend to the state of 
academic debate, which helps determine the limits of principled argument.  
 The possibility of a politically motivated concern with principle can 
be developed from insights that reoriented intellectual history in the 
1960s.108 Those insights emerged from work by University of Cambridge 
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colleagues J. G. A. Pocock, Peter Laslett, Quentin Skinner, and others who 
revolutionized the history of political thought by drawing on insights about 
the character of language that can be traced from J.L. Austin and other mid-
twentieth century philosophers of language, to Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
beyond.109 Those insights led the ‘Cambridge School’ to abandon the view 
that language was a relatively transparent medium for the representation of 
ideas.110 Instead, they saw language as a historically situated social 
convention; both the meaning of individual words and the structures within 
which those words drew their meaning changed over time.111 As a result, 
they abandoned the effort to use intellectual history to answer perennial 
philosophical questions by finding in great texts a set of static fundamental 
concepts.112 Instead, the task they set themselves was to explain how and 
why particular changes in language occurred.113 
 This new focus produced at least two insights with important 
implications for today’s history of originalism. One is that language, and the 
principles it describes, change as a result of politically motivated 
manipulations. ‘[P]olitical words,’ wrote Daniel Rogers, ‘take their meaning 
from the tasks to which their users bend them. They are instruments, 
rallying cries, tools of persuasion.’ Or, as James Tully wrote, ‘the pen is a 
mighty sword.’114  This insight has been embraced by political history of 
originalism, which describes how conservatives have manipulated 
originalist arguments to advance their goals.115 
 But the view of language as a social convention has other 
implications, too. It also means there are limits to the ways political actors 
can manipulate language.116 If language is a social construct, the meaning it 
creates is not objective, but it is ‘intersubjective,’ that is: the criteria that 
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determine whether a term applies to a particular act are set by the term’s 
common use, not by the assertions of the actor who is trying to manipulate 
it.117 As a result, when an actor tries to manipulate language to legitimate 
his behavior or political goals, he does not get to determine himself whether 
or not he has succeeded.118 The success of his attempted manipulation will 
be determined by the larger community of language users. That means an 
actor might to go too far in his attempts to, for example, manipulate an 
existing commendatory term so that could apply to his dubious actions. By 
‘going too far’ he could make clear to observers that he had changed the 
term’s meaning. He would thereby undermine his claim that his action was 
legitimate because it could be fairly described by the commendatory 
term.119 Alternatively, the actor could undermine his efforts to legitimate his 
behavior by acting in ways that made clear he was not motivated by the 
principles he espoused.120  
 The intersubjectivity of language might also limit the ability of 
actors to manipulate legal and constitutional principle. Legal principle 
might shape the behavior of hard-boiled political operatives using it only as 
a post-hoc rationalization because allowing it to shape their behavior would 
be the only way it could be an effective rationalization. When political 
actors use legal and constitutional principles to rationalize their behavior, 
they are doing it for a purpose. They are seeking to legitimate actions or 
policies they worry might otherwise be considered inappropriate or 
illegitimate. Under such circumstances, the actor would need to claim that 
his behavior was in fact motivated by some approved set of principles, and 
once he had done so, would then need to act in ways that make his claim 
seem plausible. Otherwise, those principles would fail to legitimate his 
actions. If he failed to act in accordance with his professed principles, those 
principles would not be effective tools for legitimation.121 One implication 
of this insight is that the courses of actions the actor could take would be 
limited by the range of principles that he could plausibly claim motivated 
his action.122 As a result, the problem facing an actor seeking to pursue a 
debatable course is not just how to shape existing principles to fit his goals, 
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but also how to shape his goals to fit the principles that might plausibly 
legitimate them.123 Principle, in other words, could shape a political actor’s 
actions even if he saw them only as tools to advance his interests.   
 Leading contemporary historians of political thought have applied 
similar insights to great effect.124 And the claim that the limits of principled 
legal reasoning shaped political action is a core finding of some of the best 
recent legal history, a field where ideas and power collide ‘head on.’125 
Charles W. McCurdy, for example, showed how a popular property reform 
movement in the 19th century was shaped by the ‘distinctive logics’ of both 
party politics and law.126 Cynthia Nicoletti has applied a similar insight to 
ways that arguments about secession both shaped and was shaped by the 
Civil War and reconstruction.127 Other examples include recent studies of 
how legal ideas both shaped and were shaped by the fight for civil rights,128 
welfare rights,129 workers’ rights,130 the realignment of political parties,131 
and the construction of the administrative state.132 Ken Kersch has 
described how constitutional discourse in politics helps build, undermine, 
and rebuild party and political regimes in a manner consistent with this 
insight.133 
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The same approach might also help explain how principled debates 
over originalism could shape the way conservative activists used the theory, 
even if they were using it as a rationalization. Certainly conservative 
activists like Meese and the pro-life movement saw originalism as device to 
legitimate their political preferences.134 And it is at least plausible that legal 
and constitutional principles legitimate action and have shared meanings 
that could limit the behavior of those trying to use them as tools.  
 Thus, legal principle could have shaped the development of 
originalism even if we accept that originalism is merely a rationalization for 
conservatism. An advocate of originalism motivated entirely by her political 
goals would see originalism as a tool to legitimate those goals to judges, 
politicians, the public, or, ideally, all three. Further, she would recognize 
that for originalism to be an effective tool for legitimating her goals, it 
would have to appear to be more than a mere rationalization for her 
conservative political preferences. To succeed in legitimating her political 
preferences, it must appear to be principled. As a result, she would try to 
ensure that her claims about originalism as a theory were consistent with 
relevant legal materials and our constitutional traditions. She would also 
make sure that her claims about originalism’s implications were plausible 
interpretations of the existing historical evidence, relevant legal materials, 
and the theory itself. If those materials could plausibly justify only a limited 
range of arguments and actions, then this advocate would not simply alter 
originalism correspond to her goals political. She would work to ensure that 
her alterations of the theory were plausibly consistent with those principles, 
she would shape her claims about the theory’s implications to ensure they 
too were plausible, and she may even choose to pursue a political strategy 
that was plausibly consistent with originalism rather than another that was 
not. What is more, such a politically motivated advocate would have good 
reason to attend to the debates of academics: those debates play an 
important role in determining what counts as principled debate, and what 
counts as off-the-wall raving.135  It is, for example, more difficult to dismiss 
an argument as frivolous when it has the support of the Charles Warren 
Senior Fellow in Legal History at Harvard Law School.136   
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This approach to the relationship of constitutional principle recognizes 
that principled debate might affect politics, but it does not simply reduce 
principle to politics, or ignore the complexities of academic life that make it 
more than politics by other means.  It thus offers a way to bring the 
academic and political history of originalism into dialogue without reducing 
one to the other.  It does not, of course, prove that legal principle had an 
important effect on the political uses of originalism.  Nor does it prove that 
politics, rather than principle, motivated originalism’s advocates. Those are 
empirical question.  And one can fairly question whether this argument is 
based on a simplistic and inaccurate view of the relationship between 
interests and ideas, politics and principle, and political, social, and 
intellectual history. One may see interests shaping ideas just as those ideas 
help actors to determine their interests. Ideas and action may be opposite 
sides of the same coin. Efforts to pry them apart may be doomed to failure, 
as might efforts to separate social, intellectual, and political history. ‘All 
social activity,’ Keith Michael Baker has reminded us, ‘has an intellectual 
dimension that gives it meaning, just as all intellectual activity has a social 
dimension that gives it its point.’137  This essay, however, does not try to 
resolve those devilishly difficult issues because doing so is not necessary to 
create a productive dialogue between originalism’s political and academic 
histories.   
What this essay does claim is that there are good reasons to investigate 
how the principled debates of academics have shaped the political uses of 
originalism. That effect might occur because politically motivated 
conservative activists believe at least some respect for principle is necessary 
to make originalism an effective tool. It might occur because those 
conservative activists have mixed motives. It might occur because it is 
impossible to differentiate principle and politics, ideas and action. It might 
occur because of a combination of those reasons, or for some other reason. 
This essay has assumed a straightforward division between ideas and action 
and emphasized the political motives of conservative activists to show that 
principled debates might have shaped originalism’s political uses even if we 
make the most cynical assumptions about the motivations of conservative 
activists and the role of ideas in politics.  By doing so it hopes to show that 
questions about the relationship between principle and politics in 
originalism’s past cannot be simply assumed away.  
 
Emerging from the Archives, a New History of Originalism 
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The potential of this approach is implicit in a handful of works that 
offer a glimpse of a what a new history of originalism could be. That 
scholarship is not part of a self-conscious discussion, but its paucity does 
not undermine its potential.  Even if its authors did not fully recognize it, 
their work brings to the study of originalism a new approach that might 
transform the field.  Their work differs methodologically from other 
examinations of originalism’s past because it looks past traditional legal 
materials like judicial opinions and law review articles to archival and other 
sources.  It then uses the results of that difficult historical spadework to 
illuminate with more precision the reasons political activists turned towards 
originalism and how that choice affected their behavior.  It thus provides the 
insights necessary to reconsider the interaction of academic debate and 
political action in originalism’s past. 
One example of this new approach is Mary Ziegler’s examination of 
the pro-life movement and its decision to embrace originalism, discussed 
above.138 She shows that the leadership of the pro-life movement embraced 
originalism not because of principle but because of politics. They publicly 
abandoned their natural law constitutionalism only after it failed in court 
and in Congress, and only after they realized supporting originalism would 
help them advance their goals in the Reagan administration.139 But this 
strategy had costs.140 When they adopted originalism they abandoned their 
fight to establish that a fetus had not just a moral, but a constitutional right 
to life grounded in the 14th Amendment.141 Instead, they, like other 
originalists, argued abortion should be regulated by the political process of 
the states, not the judiciary.142 Energy they had poured into changing public 
attitudes with constitutional and moral arguments was re-directed towards a 
debate over constitutional interpretation.143 When they became originalists, 
Ziegler wrote, ’abortion opponents had to down-play their most deeply held 
constitutional commitments. Instead of building support for their 
fundamental beliefs, abortion opponents turned to [originalist] rhetoric that 
promised an immediate political payoff.’144 
But why did the pro-life movement’s leadership have to publicly 
abandon those cherished principles? Why could they not keep their 
originalist cake of immediate political gain and enjoy their deeply held 
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commitments, too? The evidence indicates the pro-life movement made that 
choice out of respect for legal principle, which they respected not in spite 
of, but because of, their political motivations. The movement did not 
abandon those commitments because of politics alone. Certainly they did 
not change their views on the right to life.145 Nor does it seem they were 
motivated by constitutional principle. When they embraced originalism, 
most members of the movement were not convinced originalism was the 
best way to interpret the constitution.146   
Instead, it was their political motives that led them to respect the 
principled implications of originalist argument and, in turn, accept those 
painful trade-offs. They adopted originalism to legitimate their opposition 
to abortion rights: to undermine Roe v. Wade, to generate support for pro-
life politicians, and to gain influence with the Reagan administration.147 To 
succeed in that project, they needed to act and argue as though they were 
motivated by originalism’s principles. Otherwise, originalism would fail to 
legitimate their claims. As a result, they supported only those claims that 
were plausibly consistent with originalism as it was understood. Because 
they could not plausibly claim that originalism established that a fetus had a 
right to life anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment, they had to abandon 
that claim and its potential benefits. They respected the limits of originalist 
argument, not in spite of, but because of their political motives.  
Another example is Jefferson Decker’s analysis of how conservative 
lawyers inside the Reagan Administration used originalism when arguing 
amongst themselves over Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. The 
issues arose when First English Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angles was appealed to the Supreme Court.148 In First English, a fire 
and flood had destroyed a camp and retreat owned by the First English 
Lutheran Church. The church wanted to rebuild, but had to wait twenty-two 
months because City of Los Angles refused to provide the necessary 
permits.149 The church argued that delay was improper and that it was thus 
due compensation for this temporary and improper limit on the use of its 
land.  
The appeal presented an exciting opportunity to Roger Marzulla and 
Thomas Hookano, two economic conservatives in the Environment and 
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice. Prior to 
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government service they had worked at leading conservative public interest 
law firms to expand the protections the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause 
provided landowners.150 First English offered a way to continue that work 
by throwing the weight of the administration behind the claim that the Fifth 
Amendment protected landowners from ‘temporary regulatory takings.’ The 
Fifth Amendment had always required the government to compensate 
landowners when the government took ownership of their land for public 
purposes. But Marzulla and Hookano believed that landowners should be 
compensated when government regulations improperly limited the use of 
their land, even when the limit was only temporary.151  
 Marzulla and Hookano, however, had a problem because Charles 
Fried disagreed with them, and he was Solicitor General.152 Among other 
things, Fried feared such a doctrine would make it too easy for landowners 
to raid the treasury.153 A better way to for the courts to police illegitimate 
government regulation, he believed, was the more lenient doctrine that had 
developed as part of the Court’s 14th Amendment’s due process 
jurisprudence.154 Marzulla and Hookano tried to go over Fried’s head. They 
reached out directly to Attorney General Meese to argue their brief, rather 
than Fried’s, should be sent to the Court.155 Isolated and opposed to 
powerful interests inside the administration, Fried needed support.156  He 
found it in originalism.  
Fried does not seem to have turned to originalism because of his 
dedication to the theory as a matter of principle. His later rejection of 
originalism suggests he was a lukewarm originalist, at best.157 But First 
English occurred in the shadow of the public debate over originalism. 
Months earlier the administration had made originalism its official 
interpretive method, and in that Fried saw an opportunity. The founders, he 
wrote the Attorney General, would have easily distinguished an onerous 
regulation from a taking and thus would have denied ‘temporary regulatory 
takings’ existed. ‘Our respect for original intent makes us hostage to Clio,’ 
he wrote Meese, ‘and we must accept the consequences.’158 
Fried’s invocation of originalism may not have been driven purely 
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by principle, but the theory was also not just politics. Fried invoked 
originalism to legitimate his position. He expected it to work because he 
expected Meese and other conservatives inside the administration to respect 
the principles they had been vigorously advocating in public. And it seems 
he was right. Invoking originalism helped him fight to a draw against a 
politically powerful group within the administration.159 The economic 
conservatives ultimately won the war. The Court in First English endorsed 
the idea of temporary regulatory takings. But originalism helped Fried stop 
the administration from calling on the Court to do so. The government’s 
brief in the case adopted a compromise position, which fully satisfied 
neither Fried nor his inter-administration opponents.160 
This event, Decker argued, suggests there was a real  
 
….commitment to (some sort of) originalism by (some) key 
people within the Reagan administration. And it 
demonstrates that this commitment could have real 
consequences. Originalism offered Charles Fried a way to 
push back against a line of advocacy that he considered to 
be radical and dangerous—and of defending that push-back 
to his attorney general. For that reason, the Reagan 
administration’s public commitment to a certain way of 
reading the Constitution served as a genuine constraint on 
the policy outcome that many in his administration would 
have preferred.161 
  
 Decker, like Ziegler, did not explicitly consider whether the 
constraints he identified were the result of political motivations. But his 
research, like hers, went beyond law reviews, judicial opinions, and 
published sources to recapture examples of principle shaping the behavior 
of the Meese Justice Department and the pro-life movement. And like 
Ziegler, he did so without denying the clear importance of political motives. 
Together, their work offers a glimpse of what a new history of originalism 
might look like if we recognize that it is not necessary to make heroic 
assumptions about the motivation of political activists in order to consider 
whether principle might shape their behavior.  
 The next step towards bringing originalism’s academic and political 
histories into dialogue is to consider how academic debate shaped what 
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counted as a principled use of originalism. This is something neither Decker 
nor Ziegler explicitly considered, but there is suggestive evidence 
elsewhere. As discussed above, there has been significant overlap in both 
the topics that have interested originalism’s academic and political 
proponents, and sometimes those proponents have been the very same 
people.162 In addition, Ken Kersch has made clear at least one example of 
an academic shaping the political debate over originalism. Before Raoul 
Berger, originalist argument was a minor theme among the conservative 
activists clustered around the National Review, and sometimes it was 
explicitly rejected. But that changed after Raoul Berger added his respected 
academic voice to earlier calls for originalism by Robert Bork and then 
Justice Rehnquist. ‘With the publication of Harvard Law Professor Raoul 
Berger’s manifesto Government by Judiciary in 1977,’ Kersch wrote, ‘the 
center of gravity of conservative constitutional thought moved decidedly 
[and] rooted itself in a commitment to the interpretive theory of 
“originalism.”’163 Even if those activists saw Berger’s academic prestige as 
nothing more than a tool to legitimate their preferences, Kersch still makes 
his influence clear. That, in turn, suggests that academics may have helped 
set the limits of principled debate which even the most cynical, hard-boiled, 
political motivated activists felt would be wise to respect.164  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the byproducts of the emergence of New Originalism is a 
welcome interest in originalism’s past. It has led originalism’s proponents 
to look to the theory’s past to differentiate their arguments from the Old 
Originalism of the 1980s.165 New Originalism’s rise has also confirmed that 
originalism more broadly has survived decades of pounding from its critics. 
It may even be thriving.166 That success has led other scholars to ask how 
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that feat was accomplished and what we can learn from it.167 
Unfortunately, the accounts of originalism’s past have largely 
developed independent of one another. Each has its own explanation for 
originalism’s emergence and development over time. One emphasizes the 
role of political interest.168 The other emphasizes the influence of principled 
argument.169 This division is unproductive and unnecessary. We might find 
a way to create a productive dialogue between these histories. We might do 
so, first, by attending to the ways that conservative political interests have 
affected academic debates by shaping the institutions that produce those 
debates. And, second, we might recognize that even an advocate of 
originalism motivated purely by politics might pay careful attention to 
academic debates to ensure his arguments about the theory were plausible, 
and then conform his behavior to match those arguments.     
Opening a path to a new history of originalism offers new 
opportunities to learn from originalism’s past. If we want to understand how 
constitutional theory has influenced politics,170 it is not enough to ask 
whether Charles Fried’s arguments in the First English litigation were 
motivated by a principled commitment to originalism’s truth or by his 
policy differences with economic conservatives in the Reagan 
administration.171 We also need to ask how and to what extent originalism 
helped him change the Department’s policy.172 If we want to know what 
lessons originalism offers to the left,173 it is not enough to know if the 
leadership of the pro-life movement saw originalism as the most principled 
method of constitutional interpretation or as useful camouflage for its 
political agenda. We also need to ask what originalism offered them and 
how embracing it shaped their behavior.174  
In this new history of originalism we can also begin to see 
something else: an underappreciated role that academic debate plays in the 
process of political change. Scholars have noted that academic debates can 
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influence legal actors by legitimating particular arguments.175 But a new 
history of originalism might show those debates also shaped the behavior of 
political actors, too. Surely, academic debates are not the only influence on 
the political uses of originalism. Political interest must play a central role. 
But perhaps the relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions, 
between academics and politicians, is both more subtle and more important 
than it currently appears.  
This dialogue is not all that is necessary to build the more accurate 
and complete history of originalism that we need to help manage the 
theory’s uncertain future. Such a history also needs to embed the interaction 
of legal principle and political interest in a broader context. To understand 
the theory’s interaction with politics, we need to look beyond originalism’s 
ability to advance particular policies. Exemplary is Ken Kersch’s 
examination of the role the theory played in helping to create modern 
conservatism by unifying a fractured conservative intellectual movement.176 
And while current examinations of originalism’s history emphasize 
connections between the theory, constitutional doctrine, and politics, G. 
Edward White and Dan Rodgers have tied originalism’s emergence to much 
broader changes in America’s relationship with the past. White has pointed 
out that history re-entered constitutional debates not just through 
originalism, but though critical and neo-republican interpretive approaches 
as well. It was not just Robert Bork, but also Duncan Kennedy and Akil 
Amar who turned towards history and away from political process theory. 
White attributes that development to the decline of broad based modernist 
assumptions that the past had no wisdom superior to contemporary social 
science.177 Rodgers sees a similar collapse in separation between the past 
and present in both originalism and post-modern social theory.178 Those 
broader intellectual changes and the opportunities they offered the 
advocates and opponents of originalism are crucial context for 
understanding the theory’s development.  
Combining that broader context with a productive dialogue between 
originalism’s academic and political history can help produce a new, more 
accurate, and more useful history of originalism. But it is also true that the 
approach suggested here to the relationship of principle, politics, and 
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motive is not limited to the analysis of originalism. Other legal theories can 
be seen as efforts to legitimate political action by manipulating terms with 
commonly understood meanings. So can moral and philosophical theories. 
So too can history. And recognizing that history can play this role may help 
explain why the debate over originalism’s past is in its current state. Those 
skeptical of principle’s role in originalism’s history are also among the 
theory’s most effective critics.179 And among those who argue principle was 
the driving force are some of the most effective advocates of originalism.180 
Showing originalism’s principled core legitimates the theory. Revealing it 
as camouflage for a controversial political agenda undermines it.   
But just as politically motivated advocates of originalism could also 
be deeply concerned with constitutional principle, so too can scholars 
passionately concerned with the merits of originalism be simultaneously 
dedicated to the best traditions of scholarly debate. Motivated by the 
normative debate over originalism, and dedicated to the highest scholarly 
standards, the current divided history of originalism has raised important 
issues and provided powerful insights. As a result of it, we understand 
better the role of constitutional theory in politics, what progressives can 
learn from the right, and the differences between old and new originalism. 
But to understand the theory’s current state and likely future, we need a new 
history of originalism that has moved past the artificial division between the 
theory’s academic and political histories and past the motives that created it. 
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